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ABSTRACT
As artificial intelligence increasingly influences our world, it becomes crucial to assess its technical
progress and societal impact. This paper surveys problems and opportunities in the measurement
of AI systems and their impact, based on a workshop held at Stanford University in the fall of
2019. We identify six summary challenges inherent to measuring the progress and impact of AI, and
summarize over 40 presentations and associated discussions from the workshop. We hope this can
inspire research agendas in this crucial area.
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1 Introduction
The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence and its growing effects on science, the economy and society have
increased the need to better assess its technical progress, and economic and societal impact.
On October 30, 2019, the AI Index [27, 28, 21] held a workshop at the Stanford Institute for
Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) convening over 150 interdisciplinary experts to discuss issues in the
measurement and assessment of artificial intelligence.∗ Presentations and discussion sessions covered areas like tech-
nical progress and measurement, engineering, computational statistics, economics, law, policy, management science,
and human rights. Participants represented a variety of institutions, including academic, private, non-government, and
public sector organizations. A full list of participants and their organizations are included in the Appendix. Workshop
resources including detailed summary discussions and presentations are available publicly on google drive.
Across more than 40 workshop presentations, we identified six central problems that researchers face measuring the
progress and impact of AI systems. These problems and some of the questions the researchers inspire are:
∗We are grateful to the financial support of Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) for hosting the
roundtable workshop; the AI Index sponsors McKinsey & Company, Google, OpenAI, Genpact, AI21 labs, PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers (PwC); the organizing committee including Susan Athey, Erik Brynjolfsson, Juan Carlos-Niebles, John Etchemendy, Barbara
Grosz, Fei-Fei Li, Terah Lyons, James Manyika, Michael Sellitto, Yoav Shoham; We are grateful to Deep Ganguli and Daniel
Zhang for invaluable feedback on the draft; Special thank you to the breakout session moderators including Eileen Donahoe,
Karine Perset, Margarita Quihuis; the session panelists including Monica Anderson, Alessandro Annoni, Mohsen Bayati, Guy
Berger, Tulsee Doshi, Timnit Gebru, Ramesh Johari, Henry Kautz, Lars Kotthoff, Jamila Loud, Ashley Llorens, Christos Makridis,
Dewey Murdick, Christopher Potts, Anand Rao, Dorsa Sadigh, Jake Silberg, Andrew Smart, Prasanna (Sonny) Tambe, Rachel
Thomas, Christopher Walker, Susan Woodward, Chenggang Xu, James Zou, and all the presenters and participants; Celia Clark,
Agata Foryciarz, Lisa Simon, and Tamara Prstic for help organizing the breakout groups; Ruth Starkman, Peter Cihon, and Ankita
Banerjea for help on the copy edits.
1) What is AI?
How do we define AI? This seemingly simple question exacts significant downstream effects on assessment of R&D
productivity, public and private investment, labor market impact, and many more areas. A broadly accepted definition
would facilitate collaboration among organizations collecting AI-related data across sectors and geography.
2) What contributes to AI progress?
Technical progress in AI has mainly been measured — and driven — by comparing the performance of different
algorithms according to different metrics across publicly-available challenge datasets. Working on a single dataset
may lead to overfitting and overstatement of progress. Bias in datasets can lead to biased predictions and the illusion
of progress. Easier challenge datasets get abandoned in favor of more difficult ones, which makes tracking progress
over long periods of time more difficult. Properties of algorithms beyond their accuracy are of increasing interest,
such as robustness to statistical variation, transferability to new domains, size of training datasets (or generalizability
to small training data) and compute requirements. What should be the measure of progress and how do we explore the
tradeoffs between them and accuracy?
3) How do we use and improve bibliometric data to analyze AI and its impact on the world?
Bibliometric data has long been essential to assess the relative contributions by individual researchers, institutions, and
countries to a given scientific field, as well as mapping their collaborations. This data can be used to assess the gender
and demographic contributions of those who work in the field of AI. Bibliometrics data can also help us map out the
relationship between AI and broader investments in business, science research funding, and education. How might
more widely accepted definitions of AI impact bibliographic practices? Can we use bibliometrics data and analysis
to map the lifecycle from invention and the real world application of AI techniques? Can we develop more accurate
methods to automate the analysis of authors’ names that contribute to AI research reliably by geography, gender, and
other entity attributes?
4) How can we measure the economic impact of AI, especially labor market dynamics but also interaction with
economic growth and well-being?
AI has distributional implications on the economy and its impacts need to be more carefully assessed and analyzed.
To assess how AI contributes to inequality, it is important to measure AI inputs, i.e., skills, software, data, and man-
agement practices as well as AI outputs i.e. AI consumption patterns. Both are difficult to measure as they are often
service-based and their intangibility remains a measurement challenge. This challenge becomes even more difficult
in developing countries. In both cases, we confront the same questions: How is the deployment of AI impacting the
working lives of manual workers with routine tasks? What about workers in white-collar, high-skill jobs? How can
we know which organizations are actively deploying AI technologies into their businesses and institutions? How do
we measure the human and technical supply chain of AI systems? Can we conduct broader micro and macroeconomic
research and case studies of AI technology to better understand causal patterns and hidden interactions between AI
growth and well-being?
5) How can we measure the societal impact of AI, particularly on sustainable economic development and the
potential risks of AI to diversity, human rights, and security?
AI has the potential to address societal challenges spanning all 17 of the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). Already, 169 metrics have been proposed to track success on human rights and the UN SDGs [8].
Large-scale use of AI for social good must address explainability of AI decisions, bias, data privacy and security, and
consider the use (and abuse) of AI by various actors. Today, we have limited visibility as to where applications of AI
for social good are deployed, in which domains, and by which organizations. There is a paucity of structured data for
AI to address the SDGs.
6) How can we measure the risks and threats of deployed AI systems?
How can we better assess the threats — both current and potential — of AI systems? What tools can we use to analyze
the risks of fake news, deep fake videos, autonomous weapons, surveillance, applications that violate privacy, and so
on? What metrics could help us track each of these issues? How can we analyze the impacts of AI and use this data to
help us intervene where it has severe societal consequences?
What roles do researchers play in helping to design AI systems for furthering social good? Can AI tools be used to
address inequality or to manage geopolitical risks? How could we develop governance systems that could help AI
support human autonomy? And how can we study both the macro-scale impacts of AI, as well as its specific impact
on individuals?
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We arrived at these six central problems from in depth discussion in three breakout sessions on the following broad
topic areas:
1. Research and Development, including Technical Performance. This group reviewed data related to journal
publications, conferences, and patents, as well as questions in the measurement of the performance of AI algorithms.
2. Economic Impact and Societal Considerations for Policy Decisions. This group reviewed resource allocation
questions related to public and private investment including challenges for skill-reallocation, economic loss, including
job loss, qualified labor force reduction, distributional challenges, income inequality, and opportunities for economic
diversification.
3. AI for Sustainable Development and Human Rights: Inclusion, Diversity, Human Dignity. This group re-
viewed data and measurements indicating the positive potential of AI to serve the SDGs. Alongside these optimistic
inquiries, this group also investigated the risks of AI in areas such as privacy, vulnerable populations, human rights,
workplace and organizational policy. The socio-political consequences of AI raise many complex questions that re-
quire continued rigorous examination.
The remainder of the paper details findings from the conference in a coarse to fine manner. In particular, in Section
2, we provide a top-level summary of the plenary talk (by Susan Athey on the importance of measurement in AI) and
a synthesis of all talks from the above three breakout groups. In Section 3, we provide a detailed summary for each
individual talk from each breakout session.
2 Summary of Plenary Presentation and Sub-Groups
This section presents the summary of the plenary presentation and the three workshop sub-groups.
2.1 Summary of Plenary Presentation
Measurement meets AI
Susan Athey, Stanford University
Susan Athey kicked off the day with a presentation about the importance of getting measurement right, talking about
key considerations in choosing measurements and what good measurements can look like. She drew parallels between
the AI Index project and the guidelines published by the American Economic Association (AEA) on the principles
of economic measurement, that underscore the importance of measuring the economy consistently and reliably for
all stakeholders including central bankers, researchers, investors, and governments. In a constantly changing world,
providing meaningful and interpretable measurements in a timely manner remains challenging, especially measuring
shifts in the economy and AI. Key measurement challenges from the presentation included:
- How to define metrics that are measurable in the short term but are related to long-term outcomes. While what one
would like to measure may be distant outcomes such as earnings after an education intervention, researchers cannot
wait ten years for those outcomes to become available to evaluate the experiment. Short-term measures that are good
predictors of longer-term outcomes are therefore extremely useful in social impact research.
- Another frequent measurement challenge is whether organizations are setting the right target measurement as a
goal. Sometimes improving short-term measures can be directly juxtaposed to improving long-term outcomes, so it is
important to be mindful of what one wants to ultimately maximize.
Researchers should continue exploring interdisciplinary approaches. To get the measurement in AI policy right, it
is important to understand the domain, the principles of measurement as well as the technology, which requires peo-
ple with different backgrounds and expertise. Measuring AI well across countries and industries will identify what
technologies are working, which in turn attracts more funds to projects that are effective.
2.2 Summary of Sub-Group 1: Research and Development (including Technical Performance)
This session focused on how to measure and assess technical progress and impact of AI research. Some of the core
problems the session focused on included:
- How to define AI and to correctly capture relevant bibliometric data. How to define “AI” as a field. AI research
is highly interdisciplinary with competing definitions of the term "AI", which complicates measuring progress in AI
3
research and distinguishing it from growth in other, related areas. Some of the workshop’s solutions focused on
identifying and analyzing progress in sub-domains (such as computer vision, natural language processing). Maria de
Kleijn-Lloyd noted that to truly describe developments of a given domain, it is important not to filter out information
closely related to but not captured by our definition.
- Can we use quantitative metrics to automatically identify AI research that proposes new ideas, versus AI research that
extends existing methods? The attendees also considered ways to measure breakthroughs and contributions from indi-
vidual publications to progress on particular AI tasks. Lars Kotthoff presented a method for quantitatively analyzing
contributions of publications to progress on tasks, and drew the distinction between research that generates new ideas
and research that presents complementary approaches. During the discussion, attendees considered the importance of
measuring impact, and agreed that they would like to see work leads to more than published improvements, and that
marginal improvements often constitute important contributions.
- What technical tools exist today to help us search over literature corpora (e.g., the AI Index’s arXiv Monitor), and
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these tools, particularly to benchmark technical performance at scale. The
volume and speed of publishing in the field make it challenging to continuously track progress, even on individual tasks.
Kostas Stathoulopoulos, Robert Stojnic, and Matthew Kenney presented work aimed at enabling the analysis of arXiv
submissions. They noted that submission formats vary and the variety of data sources, pretraining, preprocessing,
training and postprocessing methods makes it difficult to compare models published even as improvements on the
same benchmark. There is now a significant effort to streamline the process of making these comparisons.
- There are tradeoffs between focusing on a single metric to measure model performance versus diverse metrics to
evaluate the capabilities of a system. Many participants brought up the contrast between the way progress is often
reported—measured by improvement on a single metric, and meaningful progress on a task. Improvement on a single
metric may be a result of overfitting to that metric without achieving meaningful progress, and may overstate actual
capacity to do things in the real world. Christopher Potts brought up the issue of comparisons to human performance,
noting that they often underestimate human performance, while methods that achieve high performance on constrained
tasks often fail on mildly adversarial examples. Dorsa Sadigh, Ashley Llorens, and Andrew Lohn noted the importance
of extensive testing and using multiple metrics to ensure the safety of automated systems. Mohsen Bayati noted that
the mismatch between good performance on a metric and the adaptation to real-world constraints is one of the big
reasons why many biomedical informatics methods have not seen wide adaptation in healthcare, despite publications
claiming promising results.
- How growth in computational power is leading to measurable improvements in AI capabilities, while also raising is-
sues of the efficiency of AI models and the inherent inequality of compute distribution. Fairness, inclusion, and ethics
were also brought up during the discussions. Dorsa Sadigh and Matthew Kenney mentioned that despite growing
researchers’ interest in exploring ethical dimensions of their fields, the topic is absent from main conference proceed-
ings, and relegated to small workshops. Finally, the participants discussed unequal access to computational power —
which has been a large contributor to recent improvements in model performance in fields such as Natural Language
Processing — and the environmental cost associated with building highly computationally complex models.
2.3 Summary of Sub-Group 2: Economic Impact and Societal Considerations for Policy Deci-
sions
This session focused on the economic and societal related analysis to guide policy discussions. Some of the core
problems discussed included:
- A recurring theme of the session was the fundamental question of what is AI. Because of the speed of development
of AI and its evolving nature, we struggled with definitional issues at an operational level; from what is AI, to who is
an AI practitioner and which skills do developing and operating an AI system require; to what is an AI company.
- Another discussion area was measuring the adoption of AI. In addition to scientific research, the participants discussed
measurement challenges for national or institutional metrics on AI human capital, training supply, data, patents, AI
entrepreneurship and industry, software development, as well as AI public policy initiatives and public opinion. Susan
Woodward from Sandhill Econometrics asked what are AI companies i.e. what companies produce AI tools, use AI
tools, or both. Comparing AI-producing companies in the US and China, Chenggang Xu reported that Chinese AI
companies tend to be medium-sized while US AI companies are, with the exception of chipmakers, small. He also
found that most AI projects in both China and the US use open AI platforms by US-based companies Google and
Facebook.
- Several speakers highlighted the difficulty of measuring AI inputs as well as AI outputs. AI inputs — skills, software,
data, and management practices — are rapidly changing and often intangible, not transacted through traditional physi-
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cal markets so their value is not assessed. Dan Rock from MIT noted that the high fixed costs and low marginal costs
of AI mean that investment-side measures may not accurately reflect value. Prasanna (Sonny) Tambe emphasized that
AI outputs are also difficult to measure as they are often service-based, with a large gap between investment and use.
- A number of researchers are using AI labor demand i.e. firms’ jobs data as a proxy for AI adoption to complement
slower and more expensive survey data. Others are using AI mentions in earning calls and AI skills data. Bledi Taska
reported that according to jobs data, AI is rapidly transforming industries such as information/high tech, services,
finance and insurance, manufacturing (but much less slowly), healthcare, and transportation. Evan Schnidman reported
that AI mentions in earning calls by sector are highest in finance by far, followed by electronic technology, health
technology, producer manufacturing, and retail trade. Several participants found that larger firms are adopting AI first.
Using global AI training and skills data, Vinod Bakthavachalam distinguished cutting-edge, competitive, emerging,
and lagging countries in terms of AI development.
- AI was viewed as having major implications for jobs, as it furthers automation. There was consensus that the nature
of most jobs will change and that AI would place downward pressure on the wages of some types of jobs and upwards
pressure on the wages of AI-related jobs. The rise in inequality is mainly driven by job polarization, a tendency that
can be observed already prior to the rise of the current AI boom and has affected countries at all income levels in the
past, including emerging and low-income countries.
- Participants viewed enabling policy and regulatory environments for AI as critical to benefit fromAI and minimize its
risks. The group discussed the need to create virtuous circles between widely adopted platforms that ensure interoper-
ability among AI systems; access to skills and human capital, access to data, software and hardware resources needed
for AI. Karine Perset, Ilana Golbin, and Anand Rao explained their respective efforts to track national governments’
AI policy initiatives to understand government concerns and initiatives and to identify good practices. Charina Choi
provided an overview of principles for public-private partnerships (PPPs) in AI development. Alessandro Annoni
underlined the need for policies and regulations to build trust in AI and in AI companies.
- The group also discussed potential risks of AI on increasing inequality and polarization within society. The lack of
good indicators on AI for developing countries remains an impediment. Some felt that those displaced by AI might
need help during a transition phase, such as data entry clerks who may not have the skills to fill new jobs created by AI
applications in areas like telemedicine. Ekkehard Ernst reported that AI was increasing inequality and job polarization
worldwide, rather than increasing unemployment, with real compensation per worker increasing since 2001 in only
the top 5% “frontier firms”. Another concern was the AI brain drain from academia to large private sector companies,
articulated notably by Zhao Jin who looked at the movement of AI professors/faculty in the US. Jin said that this
phenomenon— exponential since 2010— would reduce the number of future AI entrepreneurs.
- Consistent ways to quantify investment in AI were also discussed. In similar manner to measurement in AI private
equity investment, national statistics agencies methodologies could be updated to capture public investments in AI
R&D. Daria Mehra explained the development of an AI network map of over 4,400 AI companies and the distinction
between patterns of AI investment between China and the US. Michael Page estimated US Government investment in
AI using data on USG transactions, solicitations, and budgets and put forward that the role of the federal government
in AI funding might be evolving given private sector support for AI research on the international level.
- The productivity paradox and the time lag between adopting AI and seeing productivity gains materialize were also
central. Erik Brynjolfsson stressed that although there are significant intangible investments in AI, it takes a long time
to adapt organizational processes and overcome resistance to change and thus to enjoy productivity gains. Ramesh
Johari also highlighted the need — in addition to data and skills — to focus on organizational change as companies
look ahead at how they will process their data over the coming few years.
- Other topics related to the impact of AI on the economy, notably AI’s impact on the functioning of financial markets
— both contributing to financial instability on the one hand, and on the other, helping to detect macro and micro
risks. Peter Sarlin explained how central banks are using AI for financial stability surveillance. Christos Makridis
emphasized the importance of cybersecurity and free AI education resources such as Coursera.
2.4 Summary of Sub-Group 3: AI for Sustainable Development and Human Rights: Inclusion,
Diversity, Human Dignity
This session focused on the measurement challenges related to AI applications of sustainable development and AI
risks. Some of the core problems discussed included:
- AI has the potential to contribute to addressing societal challenges spanning all 17 of the United Nations SDGs, but
there are bottlenecks including structured data, talent, implementation challenges. Monique Tuin also highlighted risks
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including explainability of AI decisions, addressing bias, managing data privacy and security, and considering how AI
could be used (or misused) by various actors.
- Due to the classified nature of government information related to the development of fully autonomous weapons, it
is difficult to further research and provide guidance on informed public understanding of this important topic. Marta
Kosmyna surveyed global public perception, expert curated data, and measurement challenges about autonomous
weapons.
- Only select aspects of machine learning are incentivizedwithin the academic community, while other crucial stages of
machine learning are neglected, including phrasing a problem as a machine learning task, collecting data, interpreting
results, publicizing results to the relevant community, and persuading users to adopt a new technique. Rachel Thomas
highlighted that metrics tend to focus on easy-to-measure values, as opposed to genuine impact; that we cannot know
everything we will need to measure in advance; and that genuine inclusion of diverse stakeholders is difficult to
measure.
- Capacity, enabling environment, and accountability are critical to the adoption of AI in economic development,
especially across Sub-Saharan Africa. We have to deal with the low availability of academic programs and their
enrollment in Africa, an enabling environment for innovation, public and private investment to fuel the growth of
AI and algorithmic transparency. Muchiri Nyaggah presented large AI initiatives currently underway in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
- Results from eight experiments suggest that laypeople show “algorithm appreciation” if people are easily susceptible
to algorithmic advice. Don Moore discussed how we design systems to accommodate potential cognitive risks at
individual and community levels that bring visibility and transparency to how human beingsmake decisions augmented
by AI-based salient information.
- Women were underrepresented, making up just 18% of the researchers publishing at AI conferences. Yoan Man-
tha discussed the importance of more rigorous data to classify AI and gender participation to provide sound policy
guidance on pathways for women in AI at work.
- AI talent pool is highly mobile, with about one-third of researchers working for an employer based in a country that
was different from the country where they received their PhD. Deeper research is required on immigration policy and
trade in services policy at the multilateral level to balance the skill-flow of AI among countries for competitiveness.
- Risks and threats of AI, including surveillance, privacy concerns, fake news, Twitter bots, and deep fakes are hard to
measure at a local or community level. More fundamentally, discussions questioned what kind of world we want to
create and how AI can help us get there. Many moderators and panelists including Eileen Donahoe, Margarita Quihuis,
Jamila Loud, Anand Rao, Timnit Gebru discussed questions on how AI and AI research can be in the service of human
rights and how do we keep human rights from not being an afterthought in AI development and research. Participants
raised critical challenges, such as climate change and pandemics, and discussed how the community can be mobilized
to help solve them.
3 Summary of All Talks
In this section, we provide a detailed summary for each individual talk from each breakout session. Section 3.1 covers
talks on research and development. Section 3.2 covers talks on economic impact and societal considerations for policy
decisions. Section 3.3 covers AI for sustainable development and human rights.
3.1 Research and Development (including Technical Performance)
3.1.1 Technology Vectors for Intelligent Systems
Ashley Llorens, Applied Physics Lab (APL), Johns Hopkins University
This presentation focused on long-term issues of evaluating the capabilities and robustness of systems in areas like
space exploration and robotic prostheses. It derived four "technology vectors" that the AI community could attempt
to quantify and measure to assess progress towards building systems that integrate advances in AI, robotics, and other
technologies. These vectors are:
- Autonomous perception: systems that reason about their environment, focus on the mission-critical aspects of the
scene, understand the intent of humans and other machines, and learn through exploration.
- Superhuman decision-making and autonomous action: systems that identify, evaluate, select, and execute effec-
tive courses of action with superhuman speed and accuracy for real-world challenges.
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- Human-machine teaming at the speed of thought: systems that understand human intent and work in collaboration
with humans to perform tasks that are difficult or impossible for humans to carry out with speed and accuracy.
- Safe and assured operation: systems that are robust to real-world perturbation and resilient to adversarial attacks,
while pursuing goals that are guaranteed to remain aligned with human intent.
What should researchers do? Researchers should try to develop metrics that capture progress along these four
vectors. Measurements that work for integrated systems like this will facilitate the development of real-world sophis-
ticated systems that continuously team with people.
3.1.2 Towards More Meaningful Evaluations in AI
Christopher Potts, Stanford University
This presentation focused on the drawbacks of today’s methods for evaluating technical progress, especially within
NLP. Today, many researchers claim "human-level performance" on language tasks. These claims are often mis-
construed as being about general human capabilities (e.g., question answering), but they are always about achieving
certain scores on narrowly defined benchmarks. Recent developments in adversarial evaluation suggest ways to evalu-
ate systems more robustly, highlighting their narrowness.
Adversarial Evaluation
Adversarial Evaluation is about developing evaluation methods that are hard for today’s machines but would seem
easy or trivial for humans. For instance, contemporary NLP systems that obtain high-scores on existing benchmarks
for predicting the next words in sentences can be attacked with examples that a human would get right, e.g., if you
feed the sentence "Father Chrostmas is also known as" to an AI system and ask it to predict the next two words,
there’s a reasonable chance it will get this wrong, whereas a human will spot the incorrect spelling and correctly guess
"Santa Claus". Adversarial evaluation can take a variety of forms, for instance, by changing synonyms to antonyms in
language tests and seeing how systems do.
What should researchers do? Researchers should try to create more adversarial evaluation approaches, so they can
better understand technical progress (and brittleness) in these domains. They should also try and ask questions to
motivate work. Three useful questions seem to be:
- Can a system behave systematically, for example, making the same prediction (even if inaccurate) across examples
that have been changed in irrelevant ways?
- Can a system assess its own confidence — know when not to make a prediction?
- Can a system make people happier and more productive in a specific task they perform— and can we measure this?
3.1.3 Data-Informed AI Policy Analysis
Dewey Murdick and Michael Page, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown
University
This presentation focused on using a combination of analytic and data-informed techniques to answer questions rele-
vant to policy making at the intersection of AI and national security. The approach is conducive to addressing a wide
variety of questions by connecting policy-aware analysis with a wide variety of datasets, such as scholarly literature,
dissertations and theses, technical news, grant solicitations and awards, financial transactions for publicly and privately
held corporations, venture capital financial transactions, government solicitations and procurement transactions, job
postings, and career histories.
Multiple types of questions were briefly explored in the presentation. One example question was “Will U.S.-based big
tech companies dominate the frontier of AI R&D in 3-5 years?” This question was analyzed from the following angles
over time:
- Comparing industry vs. academic research output by percentage of top papers and corporate research participation;
- Estimating talent-hiring rates by exploring the absolute and relative number of job postings by AI-relevant skill sets;
- Monitoring investment and funding trends from publicly observable grants, contracts, and public and private company
investments; and
- Measuring research community growth rates and organizational membership to estimate when they will reach a
relevant level of maturity.
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What should researchers do? Researchers should make sure that their measures and metrics are contextually linked
to relevant policy questions. This helps make sure that confusion about why they matter or how they should be
interpreted can be minimized. Additionally, researchers should continue to explore ways to link datasets (e.g., by
organizational entity name) to unlock additional insights that can only be discovered across multiple datasets.
3.1.4 MAG: Leveraging AI for Scholarly Knowledge Acquisition and Reasoning
Kuansan Wang, Yuxiao Dong, Zhihong Shen, Microsoft Research
This presentation focused on a project that was initiated inside Microsoft Research to explore the extent to which
modern AI technologies, particularly in the areas of natural language understanding and machine cognition, can be
harnessed to assist researchers and technologists to keep up with the massive amount of literature and maintain or
even improve their productivity. A major outcome of the project is Microsoft Academic Graph (MAG) [34]. MAG is
a knowledge graph that captures what concepts have been published in which articles. In contrast to similar datasets
from commercial entities, MAG is largely curated by machines that automatically extracts knowledge from the entire
web document collection indexed by Bing.
MAG inherits the scale of an industrial-grade web search engine and is indeed recognized in the academic literature as
providingmore comprehensive and fresh coverage in more fields with high accuracy [29]. Additionally, rooting deeply
into the web search technology enables MAG to adapt numerous unsupervised machine learning techniques against
malicious web contents for the detection of questionable citation behaviors and the so-called predatory publishers in
scholarly communications [36]. This detection is feasible because predators appear like web spams and link farms and
the objective is to depress their apparent importance despite their quantities.
What should researchers do? The result is a measure called saliency that, in the same manner as the PageRank of
a web page, quantifies the probability of any MAG node being universally recognized as important. The efficacy of
saliency is an ongoing research topic, although early evidence suggests it possesses many desired properties without
the known drawbacks of frequently used metrics such as the citation count, h-index, and publication count in high
impact factor venues [35]. Aside from fully disclosing the methodologies, the biweekly updated MAG is also made
freely available so that all the results are reproducible and all potential biases in the datasets are patently visible.
Although it takes a considerable amount of extra efforts, open data and transparent methodologies are a necessity
towards the ethical use and responsible development of AI.
3.1.5 Peer-reviewed research — volume and quality metrics
Maria de Kleijn-Lloyd, Elsevier
This presentation focused on “using AI to define AI” by mining keywords from various sources and then writing a
classifier to identify AI research. It showed how Elsevier is using automated methods to automatically analyze the AI
publication landscape, and cluster AI research into sub-themes for deeper trend analysis.
It takes a well-structured database like Scopus — linking articles to authors and institutions — to get insights beyond
simple volume metrics. Key analyses that can be supported are:
- Article (including conference proceedings and reviews) volumes per sub-theme per geography
- Identifying key research institutes that have both high volume and high citation impact, including corporate actors
- Brain circulation: movements of researchers among geographies and between academic and corporate institutions;
comparing productivity and citation impact of mobile vs. sedentary researchers
- Diffusion: how AI research is becoming an integral part of research topic clusters outside its traditional home in
Computer Science
Scientometric analysis like the above provides crucial insight to support policy questions for universities and govern-
ments.
What should researchers do? Manually annotated examples of AI papers could be critical in developing guidelines
for labels to track fields within AI specializations. More research is needed to help clearly approximate the boundaries
of AI publication subjects, like NLP or computer vision.
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3.1.6 arXlive: Real-time monitoring of research activity in arXiv
Juan Mateos-Garcia, Joel Klinger, Konstantinos Stathoulopoulos and Russel Winch, NESTA
This presentation discussed arXlive (https://arxlive.org), an open-source data collection, enrichment, and anal-
ysis system for real-time monitoring of research activity in arXiv preprints. In detail, the authors’ collected all the
publications on arXiv and linked them to the Microsoft Academic Graph (MAG), that has more than 230M publica-
tions, then they geocoded the authors’ affiliations by linking them to the GRID, an open database with information
on research institutions. The presentation also showed novel metrics for publications on arXiv by estimating how
dissimilar the TF-IDF vector of an abstract is from its 1,000 similar abstracts.
The authors’ built a platform that provides three ways for users to interact with the arXiv data:
- Enabling rich and comprehensive searches powered by a fast, query expansion approach that returns results containing
not only the initial search term but also similar ones to it.
- Assisting users to expand their technical vocabulary and identify specialized terms by navigating the search query
space. All of the terms shown to the users are contained in the publication abstracts so they can be used directly in the
search engine.
- Updating the figures of Deep learning, deep change? Mapping the development of the Artificial Intelligence General Purpose Technology
[17] paper on a daily basis, providing policymakers and researchers access to the most recent results.
What should researchers do? There are many new measures and metrics that can be derived on top of the rich data
and services aggregated by arXlive— for example, the authors are working on estimating the amount of funding going
into AI research by parsing the paper acknowledgments from the full-text of the publications. Other aspects include
improving the search results by adding a semantic search engine that allows long-text queries while we are working
on providing daily updates of the figures of the paper on Gender Diversity in AI Research [30]. Lastly, authors’ are
developing an interface to enable the visual exploration of the search space.
3.1.7 Tracking Performance Improvement in Computer Vision
Bernard Ghanem, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
The presentation focused on tracking progress in activity understanding, a sub-field of AI research that aims to develop
systems that can parse human activity in videos and figure out what behaviors are taking place (e.g., running, or
dancing). The two main tasks discussed were:
- Activity classification in video: The datasets include YouTube8M [1], Kinetics [19, 6, 7], AVA [19]. The the goal is
to automatically predict what activity is likely occurring in a video.
- Activity detection in video: The most popular dataset is ActivityNet [4, 14, 13]. The goal is to automatically predict
when a particular activity is likely occurring in a video.
One of the challenges highlighted was that activity understanding and activity recognition research are relatively
expensive tasks in terms of the data and compute requirements, which restricts the number of people that can do
research in these areas, skewing our sense of progress.
What should researchers do? After four years of running the ActivityNet challenge, the presenter identified two
main challenges in the ongoing measurement and assessment of activities in videos:
- Though the performance in each task is improving from year to year, the rate of this improvement is slowing down.
This limitation suggests we need new research approaches to create more efficient methods. The performance on these
tasks remains far from human performance.
- Current state-of-the-art methods for activity classification and detection do not seem to exploit temporal or spatio-
temporal context well enough to accurately classify and localize an activity in video. Specifically, long activities with
unique/distinctive patterns in motion cues, objects, and human-object interactions are the easiest to classify and detect
(e.g. zumba and rock climbing); while shorter activities containing more subtle motion or object patterns are much
harder (e.g. drinking coffee and smoking). This indicates a need for new generation methods that exploit semantic
context to better classify and detect activities in video.
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3.1.8 Recent Advances in Natural Language Inference: A Survey of Benchmarks
Resources, and Approaches, Shane Storks, Qiaozi Gao, Joyce Y. Chai, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, and Michigan State University
This presentation focused on NLP research into deep language understanding beyond explicitly stated text, relying on
inference and knowledge of the world. Many benchmark datasets and tasks have been created to support the devel-
opment and evaluation of such natural language inference ability. To facilitate quantitative evaluation and encourage
broader participation, various leaderboards are consolidated in an arXiv paper by the authors [31]. The authors’ pro-
vided an overview of existing benchmark datasets widely used in the Natural Language Inference (NLI) community.
The authors noted that we need stronger justification and a better understanding of design choices for models. For
example, design choices like parameter tuning strategies are often overlooked in favor of more significant or interesting
model improvements, but these small choices can actually have a significant effect on performance. More complex
models may lead to better performance on a particular benchmark, but simpler models with better parameter tuning
may later lead to comparable results. A related topic is domain adaptation, i.e., where the distribution of training data
differs significantly from the distribution of test data. This is a good step toward generalization to unseen data. State-
of-the-art models like BERT are getting somewhat closer to this capability, being pre-trained on large text corpora and
capable of being fine-tuned to new problems with minimal effort or task-specific modifications.
What should researchers do? Researchers should build benchmarks that will help us develop more advanced natu-
ral language systems. The presenters suggested three promising avenues to explore:
- Develop benchmarks with a greater emphasis on external knowledge acquisition and incorporation; It may be worth-
while to explore new task formulations beyond the text that involve artificial agents (in either a simulated world or
the real physical world) which can use language to communicate, to perceive, and to act including interactive task
learning, implementing a physically embodied Turing Test, humans exploring limitations in understanding language
based on interaction with AI systems, and so on).
- Design benchmarks that more directly evaluate the reasoning capabilities of models. Recent results have questioned
whether state-of-the-art approaches actually perform genuine inference and reasoning for those benchmark tasks. NLI
systems can break down due to small, inconsequential changes in inputs. It is important for methods to automatically
integrate many types of reasoning such as temporal reasoning, plausible reasoning, and analogy. The majority of
benchmarks do not support a systematic evaluation of reasoning abilities.
- Special efforts should be made to reduce/eliminate superficial data bias in order for these benchmarks to be useful.
3.1.9 Measuring AI in Defense Applications: The Need for Safety and and Reliability Measures
Andrew J Lohn, RAND Corporation
This presentation focused on the measurement challenges of the Department of Defense (DoD) and military comman-
ders. High-risk defense AI applications present a new set of measurement challenges, including:
- Safety and Reliability metrics for defense-related AI systems: Defense acquisition mandates more stringent safety
requirements than commercial systems, so new measurements are required to assure performance in these scenarios.
Some particularly important are measuring system performance in response to an adversary who may seek to exploit
vulnerabilities in the system’s algorithms, implementations, or data.
- Generalization: Defense applications must be able to respond appropriately given environments and inputs that were
not explicitly foreseen. AI may need to be tested in the way that other intelligences are: through licensure. This effort
will require the ability to determine which tasks are different enough to require separate licensing, how much can a
system learn or can its environment evolve before it needs to be relicensed, and how diverse a range of implementations
can be covered by a given licensing process.
What should researchers do? Metrics and evaluations do not yet exist in sufficiently mature forms for it to be
easy to license AI technology into defense. We need to develop safety metrics and tests, along with suites of tests.
These suites will need to address questions such as which tasks are different enough to require separate licensing, and
how diverse a range of implementations can be covered by a given licensing procedure. Licensure is one of many
approaches to increase the safety and reliability of AI systems in general, particularly for military systems where
consequences can be particularly dire.
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3.1.10 Keeping up with ML progress using Papers with Code
Robert Stojnic, Papers with Code
This presentation focused on Papers with Code (PwC) — a free and open-source resource that puts together machine
learning papers, code, and evaluation tables on the web. It is built together with the community and powered by au-
tomation to help track the state of the art performance (SOTA) for specific datasets and tasks by extracting performance
results in papers and open-source code. At the time of writing, PwC contains:
- More than 120,000 papers
- 23,000 papers with code implementations
- More than 2,500 leaderboards across all areas of ML, including NLP, CV, Speech, Reinforcement Learning, and
many more.
This free resource has been built using a combination of automation and communitywork; papers and code repositories
are automatically gathered and connected, and leaderboards are automatically imported.
What should researchers do? Currently, Paperswithcode leaderboards are manually annotated tasks and datasets
with some automation. Could we build a fully autonomous agent to curate, validate, and track technical progress over
time by reading full-text papers and benchmark SOTA performance for specific tasks at scale?
3.1.11 Evaluation in Commercial Machine Translation Systems
Konstantin Savenkov and Grigory Sapunov, Intento
The number of commercially available MT systems has grown from 13 in March 2018 to 26 in November 2019,
according to an analysis by Intento. The main factor here is the availability of open-source Neural machine translation
(NMT) frameworks, which enable regional data owners to invest in the data curation and roll-out of niche MT engines
which are competitive with offers from the global players. Most commercial MT systems are built in Europe (9),
then China (8), and the US (5). In terms of the language pair support, 5 global systems support more than 3,000
language pairs, 7 in the middle tier with 300-1000 language pairs, and the rest support 20-100 language pairs (slide 23
in presentation).
Another important driver in commercial MT is the advent of domain-adaptive MT, which allows creating specialized
MT models by adapting a general-purpose model with a (comparably) modest amount of training data. These models
are hosted in the cloud using the provider infrastructure, significantly lowering the required level of ML or engineering
expertise on the client side.
The main findings are:
- The performance of the baseline models varies a lot between language pairs. Commercial MT quality is evaluated
using the hLEPOR metric. hLEPOR score of 0.7 means almost human-level quality with just a few mistakes. The
achievable hLEPOR score ranges from 0.3-0.4 for some language pairs (Chinese-Italian, French-Russian, Japanese-
French) to 0.7-0.8 for others (English-German, English-Portuguese).
- The main driver of performance is language pair popularity, which defines how much investment goes into data
acquisition and curation. Also, the next-generation translation technology (such as Transformer) is being rolled out to
the most popular language pairs first, while rare language pairs may still employ Phrase-Based Machine Translation
(PBMT) models or perform pivot translation through another language (usually, English).
- The wide range of performance across language pairs is not a mere snapshot but also demonstrates progress in the
performance of commercial MT systems.
What should researchers do? Researchers can bring greater attention to low-resource (LR) language pairs and
help make faster technical progress on LR language pairs. This is an area where there are fewer incentives for large
commercial entities to develop high-performing systems. Another important field of work is reducing the appearance
of gender bias in MT systems.
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3.1.12 On Quantifying the Role of Ethics in AI with Applications on the Assessment of Gender Bias in Machine
Translation
Pedro H.C. Avelar, Marcelo Prates, Luis C. Lamb, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
This presentation focused on two approaches to quantify ethics in AI: the first on measuring gender bias in Machine
Translation and the second on measuring whether ethics itself is discussed in papers published in the main tracks of
flagship AI and robotics venues, building upon [22].
Neural machine translation (NMT) is becoming ubiquitous, and since such tools achieve human parity in some cases,
the potential bias of such systems, caused by imbalances in training sets, is a widespread concern [23]. The study com-
pared the distribution of translations from gender-neutral languages into English, with gender labor force participation
information from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
On quantifying the role of ethics in AI research, this work looked for keywords in paper titles and abstracts published
in flagship AI and robotics venues, and by comparing the number of ethics-related keywords with a control set of
“classical” and “trending” AI keywords.
What should researchers do? Four actions are proposed to alleviate gender bias in NMT:
- MT tools could provide confidence scores for individual words, allowing users to identify how severe is the bias
present by the tools
- One could use a test suite to evaluate the system for biases, much like the one used in this case study, and either report
such biases to its users or decide not to release the tool
- A subset of the training dataset could be curated to mitigate biases learned in other portions of the data.
- Regarding ethics at AI conferences work, researchers could explore a more comprehensive taxonomy of ethics-related
keywords for bibliometrics analysis.
3.1.13 Quantifying Algorithmic Improvements over Time
Lars Kotthoff, University of Wyoming
This presentation focused on quantifying the improvement that a particular contribution has made to the state of the
art. Generally, competitions almost exclusively focus on standalone performance — each submission is run on a set
of benchmark problems, and the submission with the overall best performance wins. The state of the art in this field is
now defined by the winner of the competition, even though it may not achieve the best performance on all benchmark
problems. Arguably, the other submissions also contribute to the state of the art — they might focus on narrower
parts of the benchmark space and show overall worse performance, but really excel on what they focus on. This is
completely ignored by standalone performance.
The author proposed to use the Shapley value, a concept from co-operative game-theory that assigns a unique dis-
tribution of total surplus generated by a coalition of players. In this instance, the Shapley value was used to assess
the contributions of individual submissions to a competition to the overall state of the art [11]. Importantly, it does
not suffer from the problem outlined above and gives credit to all submissions that show promise on any part of the
benchmark set. The proposed approach enjoys all the guarantees of the Shapley value, namely additivity (allowing
multiple performance measures to be combined), efficiency (the overall value is distributed entirely), dummy player
(a contribution that does nothing gets no credit), and symmetry (two submissions that are identical have identical
contributions).
The author proposed a temporal modification of the Shapley value that takes into account that the state of the art in
a field was not defined in one fell swoop, but developed over time [18]. Later approaches are based on earlier ones
that should receive credit for paving the way — the temporal Shapley value achieves this by allowing submissions to
contribute only to the state of the art after they were created, while retaining the desirable properties of the Shapley
value.
What should researchers do? Researchers should use the Shapley value to evaluate competitions and the temporal
Shapley value to track the progress of the state of the art in a field over time. Using these measures instead of the
standard standalone performance gives a more accurate picture of the state of the art and encourages collaboration to
advance a field as a whole rather than incentivizing small improvements across large and diverse sets of benchmarks.
Research efforts can be focused on particular sub-fields while receiving credit for such focused advances.
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3.1.14 Human Forecasts for Technical Performance Progress
Ben Goldhaber, Metaculus
This presentation focused on calibrated forecasts from human beings to guide strategic decisions within the AI
field, for example, AI technical benchmarks and landmark events. Between Dec 2018 and Dec 2019, Metaculus
(ai.metaculus.com) and AI Index conducted a prediction tournament on questions relevant to the AI research com-
munity.
Through a series of structured interviews, 100 questions expected to be valuable to policy makers were solicited
and written. Then, using Metaculus as a platform, a community of forecasters and researchers was asked to register
predictions on the questions. In total over the past year, 2700 predictions were made. While many of the questions
have not yet been resolved, to date the community has an average Brier Score (proper score function that measures the
accuracy of probabilistic predictions) of 0.146, notably better than an uninformed forecaster.
What should researchers do? How can we extend human forecasts to cover more questions of interest and incorpo-
rate structured clusters of questions? Researchers should develop key questions for human forecasts on AI’s technical
performance and broader implications for curated expert foresights.
3.2 Economic Impact and Societal Considerations for Policy Decisions
3.2.1 China AI Index: China-US Comparison
Chenggang Xu, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB) and London School of Economics
(LSE)
The presentation focused on China-US comparisons from the China AI Index. One of the major purposes of this
project is to improve our understanding of the upcoming industrial revolution, driven by AI, in different economic
systems. The failure of the Soviet Union in semiconductors, ICs, and computers were deeply rooted in its system
[24, 37]. This project is designed to help reveal the performance of the Chinese system, which is a reformed Soviet
system, vis-à-vis that of the counterpart in the US. The following evidence presented was revealing on the US-China
economic dynamics:
- US AI firms are either very large or small, whereas most AI firms in China are medium-sized. A typical US AI firm
has no more than 10 or a few dozen employees. The United States also has five large AI companies that employ more
than 5,000 workers while China has none.
- The gap between China and the US is shrinking in certain areas such as computer vision research or broader AI
publications. In other areas such as basic research or papers with at least 1,000 citations, there is no evidence of
convergence. For example, the number of Chinese and US CVPR conference participants converged by 2018 and in
total publication and total citation, the gaps between the US and China continue shrinking. However, in areas that are
more in basic research, there is no observable convergence. For example, mostly US authors are participating in ML
Conference or papers with more than 1,000 citations.
- Chinese researchers rely heavily on US open-source software packages for basic algorithms based on data from
Github. Most of the open-source AI software packages used (starred) by Chinese AI researchers are developed by US
institutions, and the most popular one is TensorFlow developed by Google. In general, the number of US-developed
open source AI software packages starred by researchers from both countries is twenty times more than those devel-
oped by Chinese institutions.
What should researchers do? Researchers should study the role of institutions and market structure on the success
and failure of AI projects between two distinct market designs. The more efficient R&D system must try a large
number of projects and rely on the market to screen ex-post. But this mechanism can work only when the system is
able to commit to terminate unpromising projects. When a system is not able to do so, they will replace the ex-post
market screening mechanism, by ex-ante bureaucratic selection. In this case, the number of projects will be much
smaller and each ex-ante selected project will receive more resources. The author proposed that given the uncertain
nature of the technology, it is likely that ex-ante betting on small number projects will be out-performed by the system
which is able to bet on a large number of projects. Researchers should conduct theoretical and empirical research to
improve our understanding of the relationship between market design and the successful execution of AI projects.
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3.2.2 Measuring AI investment: Why does it matter and why is it challenging?
Prasanna Tambe, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
This presentation focused on two areas of measurement in AI: its use and its impact. It highlighted that measuring AI’s
value may be harder than it has been for its technological precursors. Extensive regulatory attention is being focused
on AI developments, as well as the legal factors and new policy initiatives that govern the use of data and algorithms,
such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which can affect how AI technologies will be deployed.
The returns to AI technologies and the pace at which these are realized, therefore, may be difficult to anticipate and
profoundly different across nations, states, or even cities and counties.
On measuring the use of AI:
A number of disparate inputs are required to put AI into production — human capital, software, data, computational
power, and new management practices — none of these are easy to observe and statistical agencies do not regularly
collect data on them. For mature information technologies such as network administration, database management, and
web development, some of the inputs to technology investment (such as software licenses) are available and can be
used to track usage effectively. However, firms are still adjusting inputs to AI and experimenting with the technology,
so even investments that can be observed tend to be noisy indicators. For instance, rapid changes to AI technologies
can change the value of investments in AI-related skills [25]. Similarly, heavy reliance on open-source software in
corporate data science makes any data that is available on AI software spending likely to be noisy. Other inputs that
might indicate AI use, such as specific types of data assets or differences in firms’ management practices, are generally
even more difficult to track consistently.
On producing robust evidence on the impact of AI:
The regulatory and environmental constraints, as well as “hidden” factors such as differences in the quality of firms’
data assets, can influence the returns to AI technologies. Moreover, many corporate AI projects are in the trial phase,
and have yet to be deployed. Data on the use of AI within the firm, therefore, may not yet correlate with anymeasurable
impact. Differences in management practices can also have an important role to play in gains from new technologies,
but management practices are costly and time-consuming for firms to install or change. Indeed, there can be a signif-
icant time-lag between when new technologies such as AI are adopted by industries and when they start to produce a
measurable difference in productivity.
What should researchers do? The availability of new and increasingly granular data will be valuable to better
measure the use of AI and study the impact of AI including:
- Data on corporate activity collected through digital channels is a formidable weapon for empirical researchers and
has the potential to significantly improve our ability to track changes in firms’ technological configurations [16].
- Some of the author’s recent work has used data such as those collected and curated by platforms such as LinkedIn
and Burning Glass Technologies to generate measures of investments in skills related to data and algorithmic decision-
making [32, 33, 2].
- Software use might be tracked through other digital platforms, such as GitHub, in similar ways. Of course, it may be
the case that the factors that these data sources cannot shed light on, such as firms’ management practices, might be
the most important ones for explaining returns to AI technological progress.
3.2.3 Measuring AI Dynamism and Impact on Inequality
Guy Berger, LinkedIn
This presentation focused on three areas of economic measurement:
- The slowing dynamism conundrum: A wide range of metrics — productivity growth, business creation and de-
struction, interest rates, etc. indicate that the pace of change and transformation in the US and global economies has
slowed down dramatically over the past 10-15 years. A deeper understanding of why innovative technologies like AI
are not showing up as meaningful in the economic data and catching inflection points early is essential.
- Can we quantify how technology is diffusing across regions, occupations, and industries? Is reskilling happening
at an individual level, or only at an aggregate level?
- Distributional outcomes and inequality: As political and social events across the globe suggest,being able to
identify “winners and losers,” and designing institutions and technological implementation in a way that equitably
shares the gains from technology gains, is going to be essential.
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What should researchers do? Researchers should comprehensively study the impact of emerging technologies on
the economy and society. Let’s assume that despite taking longer than the hype suggests, AI eventually transforms
our economy in a meaningful way. It’s not the only force that’s going to do so. We will see the impact of other
technologies; we are going to experience potentially significant climate change, massive fluctuations of the business
cycle, and policy changes that will make a huge difference. We need to properly contextualize the economic impact of
AI relative to those other forces, and to understand how it either complements or substitutes for them.
3.2.4 Macro-economic impact of AI
Ekkerhard Ernst, International Labor Organization (ILO)
This presentation focused on AI and its impact on jobs, productivity, and inequality from a global lens. The presenta-
tion showed that:
- Automation has a significantly stronger impact on employment in developing countries: The impact of robotization
on employment is more than ten times as large in emerging economies than in advanced economies. The impact comes
from both a direct effect of automation on low-skilled jobs and a reshoring effect [5].
- The impact of AI on jobs might be more diverse. AI is a general-purpose technology that can have effects both
on labor and capital productivity. A particularly large impact might be expected through improvements in network
management to enhance Total Factor Productivity (e.g. electricity, transportation, waste management, networks of
global value chains, etc.). The benefits of these AI innovations might be higher in emerging countries as they typically
suffer from the lack of or low-quality infrastructure.
- To measure the relative impact of capital- vs labor-saving impacts of technology, the authors’ used a new indicator
by [9] to measure the extent to which AI transforms different occupations in the US. Following [10] they apply this
measure together with the risk of computerization developed by [12] to 4-digit occupational categories in the US,
Thailand, and South Africa.
The findings include:
- For the US: A polarization of jobs is visible with 9 of the 10 largest occupations characterised by the high risk of
automation (labor-savingAI) and in almost half of all occupations characterized by transformational AI (capital-saving
AI).
- For Thailand (and South Africa): The polarization is titled much more towards occupations characterized by a high
risk of automation. Moreover, a large share of occupations is characterized by disruption AND transformation, i.e.
machines are likely to replace human labor even more rapidly and thoroughly than through simple automation.
What should researchers do? Researchers should study the dynamics of AI and inequality more than job loss,
at least in OECD countries. To better understand the society-wide implications of AI, proper indices are needed to
monitor AI deployment. Simply counting the number of patents or measuring digital bandwidth remains insufficient.
The presentation suggested four dimensions that warrant closer analysis:
- Network applications, for instance for Smart City deployments would affect electricity, transportation, urban plan-
ning, or trading networks. This research requires a closer look at the digital divide between advanced and emerging
economies. A simple look at smartphone penetration rates might bring some initial information on how these tech-
nologies can be applied in specific circumstances (Deloitte produces a Smart City index).
- The current analysis of the economics of AI lacks a clear understanding of the resource implications of AI. Most
types of analysis implicitly conclude that AI could reach a stage where it has absolute advantages over human labor.
This assumption neglects the fact that AI applications already consume significant amounts of energy that are likely
to prevent a full deployment of automating AI. On the other hand, AI applications explicitly targeted at a reduction
in energy consumption (e.g. electricity grid management) could contribute to help reduce carbon emissions. AI
applications should be indexed according to their net energy consumption and carbon footprint.
- AI applications have very different effects depending on their sectors. The potential for sectoral productivity gains
might, therefore, differ significantly. Rather than characterizingAI applications according to their automation potential
generally, it might be more useful to develop sector-specific AI indices.
3.2.5 Measuring the Economic Effects of Artificial Intelligence
Daniel Rock, MIT
This presentation focused on AI as a new variety of GPT by using novel firm-level data. [25] develops an online
resume-based measure of firm-level AI talent using LinkedIn profile data and shows:
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- A taxonomy that classifies self-reported skills as having AI content.
- Uses firm-level measures of AI skill stocks to estimate the impact of AI technologies on the market values of those
firms.
This paper finds that:
- The launch of Tensorflow, a deep learning software module open-sourced by Google, caused a roughly 4-7% increase
in the market value of AI-using firms.
- The capital base of AI-using firms became more valuable as a result of complementary AI talent becoming more
abundant.
- Firms that are more exposed to ML technologies via the tasks performed by their workers have declined in value in
recent years.
What should researchers do? Researchers should explore the following areas to improve data and related uncer-
tainties to track AI adoption for firms and regions:
- Data uncertainties to assess complementarity and substitution effects of AI skills. Some economic actors, like workers
with AI skills, are poised to benefit from technological advances. Others might be negatively impacted as their skills
or business models are obsoleted by new developments. This balance of complementarity and substitution is partially
measurable via skills measurement on platforms like LinkedIn. These online resumes are attractive both because they
can identify the occupational composition of firms (and therefore aggregated exposures to new technologies like AI),
and also because indices of the organizational capital and skills necessary to implement technology are recoverable
from what workers claim to know. Of course, there are substantial limitations in terms of coverage over time, cross-
sectionally by worker and/or company, and in the type of skills that are reported.
- Address sampling bias in job datasets. Econometric techniques to adjust for sampling bias and normalization of
these datasets should be a major prerequisite for any analysis using these sources. Done well, as with job posting data
from Burning Glass Technologies in [15], these "digital breadcrumbs" can be especially revealing about changes in
the overall economy. Additionally, the macroeconomic effects of new technologies can be better resolved following
frameworks like that in [3].
3.2.6 A short introduction to CSET and US government spending on AI
Michael Page, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University
This presentation focused on US government AI spending data to guide policy decisions. The US government makes
available several different categories of spending data. Transactions — which include grants, contracts, loans, and
other financial assistance — are available on USAspending.gov. USAspending in turn collects data from several
sources, including the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) for prime contract data. Solicitation data is available
on SAM.gov (formerly Federal Business Opportunities). Budget data is available on different agencies’ websites.
For example, historic Department of Defense budget data is available on the Defense Technical Information Center’s
website.
What should researchers do? Researchers should use multiple sources of data to cross-reference and to analyze
government spending on AI. Measuring public AI investment in the US poses several challenges:
- Data quality. Data from USASpending.gov, for example, is often missing or mislabeled.
- What’s “AI?" Identifying what spending is “artificial intelligence” related can be challenging for several reasons,
including (i) transactions often contain little descriptive information; and (ii) some programs might be rebranded with
AI keywords, leading to an inflated estimate of AI-related growth.
- International comparisons. Because government spending serves different functions in different countries, direct
comparisons can be misleading.
- What is the federal government’s role in AI funding? Given the research community’s private-sector support and
international character, the role of the federal government might be evolving.
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3.2.7 Measuring Private Investment in AI
Daria Mehra, Quid
This presentation focused on assessing the global, regional, and sector-based activities of AI startups and investors.
The author used Quid to search for all startups that received more than $400,000 in investment during the last ten
years. The results showed that:
- Global AI investment has continued to increase by an average of 48% each year since 2014.
- The US has held a dominant lead in terms of the number of startups and overall investment in the industry. A few
exceptionally high investment deals with Chinese startups over the last year have begun to close the gap.
- Comparing investment totals on a per capita basis, however, Israel takes the top spot, followed by Singapore.
To surface popular destinations for investment, the presentation identified unique sectors within the larger AI industry.
- During the last year, companies working on autonomous vehicles received the largest share of investment, followed
by MedTech (specifically for cancer drugs and therapy) and facial recognition for law enforcement/surveillance. The
largest growth sectors for AI technology included robotic process automation and supply chain management.
- While AI startups in the US and Europe shared some common sectors, including MedTech, Text Analytics, and
Retail Tech, AI companies in China were heavily focused on Industrial Automation (specifically oil & gas), Facial
Recognition, and EdTech. India had far fewer startups than other countries surveyed, with a greater interest in Robotic
Process Automation, Credit Cards/Lending, and Hospitality/Travel.
What should researchers do? Researchers should explore robust taxonomies and semi-auto labeling methods to
classify an AI company. It is also important to distinguish AI companies producing new AI from those applying it. A
third-class of companies are just posers and write AI in their company information. With these distinctions in mind,
researchers should integrate and analyze multiple sources of information about a company including corporate filings,
earnings calls, news articles, patents, blogs, social media, etc. to comprehensively identify core AI components of a
company. There is no database of intangible products and services that companies are deploying and thus it is very
difficult to track how many products and services in the market may have AI components. Deeper research is required
to build companies’ profiles and pathways of AI adoption to distinguish large and small companies.
3.2.8 Where to Now: measuring specialization, disruption, and diversity in AI R&D
Juan Mateos-Garcia, Joel Klinger, Konstantinos Stathoulopoulos and Russel Winch, NESTA
This presentation focused on measuring deep learning specialization and its contribution to application domains. An-
alyzing textual descriptions of AI R&D with topic modeling algorithms shows the growing use of deep learning on
arXiv:
- The rise of China as one of the global leaders in deep learning research
- The importance of co-location between research and industrial capabilities for developing strong deep learning clus-
ters.
- Countries with lower levels of political and civil freedom (and in particular, China) are overrepresented in the facial
recognition field.
- Thematic disruption brought about by the arrival of the deep learning paradigm, with formerly dominant topics related
to symbolic and statistical approaches to AI losing centrality in favor of deep learning.
- Academic institutions tend to be more theoretically diverse than corporate labs pursuing narrow research agendas.
These findings highlight the important role of public interest research and funding to preserve diversity in AI research.
What should researchers do? Researchers should leverage open source data and code to help track AI activity in
a more dynamic manner. To enable policymakers and practitioners to explore the rich and complex landscape of AI
R&D that is revealed, researchers should use novel data sources and methods to dig beneath the surface of highly
aggregated, monolithic indices of AI activity.
3.2.9 AI Brain Drain
Michael Gofman and Zhao Jin, University of Rochester
As AI becomes one of the most promising and disruptive technologies, the top tech firms are trying to corner the market
for AI talent, especially AI professors. AI professors at North American universities are being offered compensation
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packages by corporations that universities cannot match. This presentation presented the following new insights about
the AI brain drain:
- Between 2004-2018, 221 professors at North American universities accepted an industry job. The reallocation of
AI human capital from research universities to the private sector has important consequences for the entrepreneurship
activity of the students in the affected universities.
- Following AI faculty departures, the authors’ found a negative causal effect on the quantity and quality of innova-
tion, measured using the entrepreneurship data of 3,000 STEM alumni, 363 AI entrepreneurs, and 177 AI startups.
They conclude that knowledge transfer via higher education is an important channel for the diffusion of AI-driven
technological change.
- AI faculty departures have a negative effect on the early-stage funding of AI startups with founders who graduated
in year t from the affected universities. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the tenured professors’
departures in time window [t-6, t-4] decreases, on average, first round and series-A round funding by, respectively,
$0.6 million and $3.15 million. Relative to the sample average, these numbers imply a 22% decrease in first-round
funding and a 28% decline in series-A-round funding. Moreover, a one standard deviation increase in the tenured
professors’ departures in time window [t-6, t-4] decreases funding growth from the first round to the second round by
20%.
- Departures by tenured professors’ 4-6 years prior to the students’ graduation year have the largest effect. Specifically,
for a given university, a one standard deviation increase in tenured professors’ departures during time window [t-6,
t-4] on average reduces the number of future AI entrepreneurs who graduate in year t by 13%. The effect is most
pronounced for the top 10 universities, entrepreneurs with PhD degrees, and for startups in the field of deep learning.
What should researchers do? The AI brain drain from universities affects innovation by firms, universities, and
students. It could be interesting to study the effect of AI faculty departures on the productivity of companies they
join, the knowledge creation in the universities that they leave, and on the labor market outcomes of AI students in the
affected universities. This analysis would give policy makers a more comprehensive picture of the net effects of the
brain drain on productivity and externalities in the labor market for AI talent.
3.2.10 Central Bank and Corporate Perceptions of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Evan A. Schnidman, Prattle
This presentation focused on the relative use of AI terminology across central banks and corporations. The main
findings were:
- Both central banks and corporations are discussing AI with much greater frequency over the last 3-5 years. This
finding was consistent across central banks and corporate asset classes, but some outliers are discussing AI a great
deal more than their peers.
- The Bank of England remarks on AI with greater frequency than other central banks. The data also indicates that the
Bank of England remains a thought leader among central banks. Over 30 years ago the BOE led global central banks
toward increased transparency and more recently BOE personnel have been at the forefront of blockchain research.
- The financial services sector appears to be discussing AI with greater frequency than other sectors, but this finding
could be a bit misleading as the number of finance companies are overrepresented in the sample of public US com-
panies. Collectively sectors such as technology, health technology, and electronic technology are discussing AI more
frequently than the financial services industry.
- Mentions of AI increased more substantially among mid- and small-cap companies than among large-cap companies.
What should researchers do? Researchers should further study to determine how actively AI is being deployed and
in what ways it is being utilized. A comprehensive AI index indicating which companies are using this technology
(as measured by staffing, patents and other measures), as opposed to merely talking about it, could be a valuable path
forward to continue this research.
3.2.11 Coursera Global AI Skill Index
Vinod Bakthavachalam, Coursera
This presentation focused on the Coursera Global Skills Index (GSI) that draws upon rich data to benchmark 60
countries and 10 industries across Business, Technology, and Data Science skills to reveal skill development trends
around the world.
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Coursera measures the AI skill proficiency of countries and industries overall and in the related skills of math, machine
learning, statistics, statistical programming, and software engineering.
Using a derivative of the Elo algorithm for chess rankings, Coursera measures the skill proficiency of each learner on
the platform across these skills based on their performance on relevant graded assessments, adjusting for the difficulty
of assessments taken.
- Developed countries tend to place in the top half of the world skill rankings while developing countries rank in the
bottom half. The current inequality is likely to increase.
- The authors find that the correlation between AI skills and skills in statistics and machine learning is the highest
while the correlation between AI and other skills like software engineering is lower. This is likely because the current
weight of AI applications revolves around utilizing machine learning and related statistics concepts today.
What should researchers do? Researchers should discover potential new uses of this data, such as tracking country
and industry progress in AI skills over time, connecting external data to better understand how learning drives perfor-
mance, and creating novel hiring signals off of these skill proficiency measures to unlock new career opportunities for
people. Related research questions are how these skills can create pathways for future work opportunities.
3.3 AI for Sustainable Development and Human Rights: Inclusion, Diversity, Human Dig-
nity
3.3.1 The Problem with Metrics — what’s not captured?
Rachel Thomas, University of San Francisco
This presentation focused on the inherent problem with metrics. The more a metric is used and the more importance
placed on it, the less useful it becomes (due to inevitable efforts to manipulate or game it). This tension is captured in
Goodhart’s Law, “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.”
Any metric is just a proxy for what you really care about. Examples of this abound:
- The difference between citation counts for a paper vs. actual impact.
- The number of students taught versus what they understood and internalized.
- Diversity statistics on the composition of a company versus knowing how employees from underrepresented back-
grounds were treated, what opportunities they were given, and if their feedback was listened to.
- Benchmark tasks versus the suitability of those benchmarks towards real-world applications.
What should researchers do? Metrics will always be incomplete, and therefore should be combinedwith qualitative
information. Ensuring that a diverse group of stakeholders is not just included, but that their feedback is incorporated
into the project. Such inclusion remains a more complex endeavour than just checking off a task. An example
of a failure in this area is the recent revelation that while Sidewalk Labs (a Google/Alphabet subsidiary) held an
Indigenous consultation workshop, 0 of the 14 recommendations that resulted from that consultation were included
in the final 1,500-page report . Despite this, the report mentions the Indigenous consultation numerous times. One
Indigenous elder, Duke Redbird, who participated in the consultation said, “It was just shocking that there was kind of
a blatant disregard for all of the work that we did. They just wanted to check off a box that says, ’We did Indigenous
consultation.’” While metrics can be useful, we must beware of the risks of over-emphasis and potential shortcomings
as we work towards healthier outcomes.
3.3.2 Applying AI for social good
Monique Tuin, McKinsey Global Institute
This presentation focused on the analysis of McKinsey library of about 160 use cases where there is evidence that AI
can be applied for social good. For about one-third of use cases in the library, an actual AI deployment in some form
was identified.
- AI has the potential to contribute to addressing societal challenges spanning all 17 of the United Nations SDGs. The
use cases map to all 17 of the SDGs, supporting some aspects of each one. The highest number of use cases in the
library map to SDG 3 (Good health and well-being) and SDG 16 (Peace, justice, and strong institutions).
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- To scale AI for social good, bottlenecks and risks will need to be addressed. Scaling up will require overcoming
significant bottlenecks, especially to address data accessibility, talent availability, and ‘last mile’ implementation chal-
lenges.
What should researchers do?
- Study AI Risks. Large-scale use of AI for social good entails risks that will need to be mitigated, including
improving explainability of AI decisions, addressing bias, managing data privacy and security, and considering how
AI could be used (or misused) by various actors.
- Grow the list of AI use cases for SDGs. Today, we have limited visibility as to where applications of AI for social good
are deployed, in which domains, and by which organizations. Measuring this could help the social impact community
direct investment to high potential areas with limited deployment.
- Make better use of structured open data for training and transparent deployment. AI could be used to measure
progress towards the SDGs themselves. The UN SDGs consist of 244 indicators measuring global metrics, from the
number of individuals living within two kilometers of an all-season road, to damages caused by natural disasters. AI,
applied to government data sources, satellite imagery, or user-generated mobile data, could help us better understand
the impact of efforts to address the UN SDGs, and support measurement of progress towards the goals, globally and
at the national and regional level.
3.3.3 Ethics and AI: Global News Media
Daria Mehra, Quid
This presentation focused on analysis related to the volume and evolution of the AI ethics narrative in global news
outlets over the past year. The authors’ created a comprehensive boolean search query using global news media
data from LexisNexis using the ethics principles as defined by Harvard University’s Principled Artificial Intelligence
report. The resulting 3,661 unique articles were then classified into seven topic areas based on language similarity:
Framework and Guidelines (32%), Data Privacy Issues (14%), Facial Recognition (13%), Algorithm Bias (11%), Big
Tech Advisory on Tech Ethics (11%), Ethics in Robotics and Driverless Cars (9%), and AI Transparency (6.7%).
What should researchers do? These results indicate that while government and international institutions are leading
voices in the conversation around setting guidelines and developing ethics frameworks, concerns over data privacy,
algorithm bias, and the growing prevalence of facial recognition technologies are hotly debated topics in the public
arena. Researchers should develop an open-sourcemonitoringmethod to track the popularity of AI and ethics narrative
to dynamically assess AI opportunities and risks by regions.
3.3.4 Analyzing Metrics to Track Autonomy in Weapon Systems
Marta Kosmyna, Campaign to Stop Killer Robots
This presentation focused on available evidence on public opinion about autonomous weapons (AWs) and deployed
AWs around the world. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots commissioned three independent polls (Ipsos 2017,
Ipsos 2018 , and YouGov 2019) to gauge public opinion on fully autonomous weapons. A YouGov poll of ten EU
countries, conducted in October 2019, showed 73 percent of European respondents thought their government “should
work towards an international ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems.”
A 2018 global Ipsos poll surveying 28 countries, showed 61 percent of the public opposed the use of fully autonomous
weapons systems. Of those opposed, a majority of respondents cited their reasoning as these weapons would be
“unaccountable.” A 2015 poll conducted by the Canadian Open Roboethics Initiative showed 56 percent of global
participants thought “lethal autonomous weapons systems should not be developed or used.”
A 2017 report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) analyzed the development of au-
tonomous weapons systems, how these systems are currently used, and potential options for the regulation and moni-
toring of their development. These reports rely on open-source information such as news articles, industry and defense
guides, scientific publications, company websites, surveys, and press releases.
The presentation made it clear that one of the key challenges in measuring the impact of the classified nature of
government information is related to the development of fully autonomous weapons.
What should researchers do? To measure how AI relates to lethal autonomous weapons, researchers could track
mentions of key-words in digital news sources, such as “AI and warfare,” “AI and policing,” “autonomous weapons,”
“killer robots,” “automatic target identification,” etc. Open source research could also track notable statements from
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public officials on fully autonomous weapons, national defense budgets for AI, as well as the development of national
AI policies. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots keeps a chronology of work and tracks events, conferences, and pan-
els related to the topic of fully autonomous weapons. Researchers should also track data related to AWs in developing
countries and avoid overemphasis on the development of these weapons by advanced economies.
3.3.5 Artificial Intelligence in Sub-Saharan Africa
Muchiri Nyaggah, Local Development Research Institute (LDRI)
This presentation focused on ongoing AI activity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and ideas to grow the adoption of
AI in SSA. The presentation highlighted some of the ways different organizations are investing in AI in SSA. Some
examples included:
- Google is investing in AI labs on the continent with the first one already operational in Ghana.
- Microsoft is rolling out a $100m investment in AI, machine learning, mixed reality development starting in two
countries in Africa.
- NASA, the Australian government, and the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data are bringing pro-
cessed earth observation data to developers working on big data and AI for development in Africa via a scheme called
the Africa Regional Data Cube.
What should researchers do? Researchers should help release more data and address the following challenges to
grow adoption of responsible AI in development across SSA including:
- Capacity: Unless we deal with the low availability of academic programs and their enrollment in Africa, we will
have low capacity and be net importers of AI with its accompanying biases. We therefore need to measure the quantity
and content of AI and AI-related academic programs in African universities, as well as the growth of faculties and the
enrollment/graduation from these programs.
- Enabling environment: A conducive market environment is required to enable innovation, investment, and growth
of AI. We therefore need to measure periodically the extent to which critical policy-level enablers are in place and
enforced.
- Accountability: If we fail to ensure there’s some level of algorithmic transparency in governmentwe risk perpetuating
and strengthening existing inequalities and injustices in the global south. We, therefore, need to track instances
of algorithmic injustice and their resolution to hold public sector institutions to account on improvements required,
procurement, data use and possibly even restitution.
3.3.6 Algorithm Appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human
Jennifer Logg, Julia Minson, Don Moore, Harvard Kennedy School and Haas School of Business, UC
Berkeley
This presentation focused on results from eight experiments [20] suggesting that lay people show “algorithm appre-
ciation.” Specifically, people are more receptive to advice when they think it comes from an algorithm than a person
when making estimates and forecasts. People showed “algorithm appreciation” when making estimates about: - A
visual stimulus (Experiment 1A; N = 202)
- Forecasting the popularity of songs (Experiment 1B; N = 215) and
- Forecasting romantic matches (Experiment 1C; N = 286)
Numeracy appears to be a mechanism for reliance on algorithms; those in Experiment 1A who scored higher on a math
test [26] relied more on algorithmic advice.This effect was obtained across multiple operationalizations of “human”
vs. “algorithmic” advice.
Interestingly, when the researchers provided judgment and decision making researchers from the society’s mailing list
with the surveymaterials from Experiment 1C (Experiment 1D; N = 119), they predicted the opposite results. Although
mTurk participants displayed algorithm appreciation when predicting romantic attraction, researchers expected them
to display algorithm aversion. The idea that people are averse to algorithmic advice is evidently pervasive, even among
expert researchers.
Reliance on algorithms was robust in presenting the advisors jointly or separately (Experiment 2; N = 154). However,
algorithm appreciation waned when people chose between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an external
advisor’s; Experiment 3; N = 403). These tests are important because participants could improve their accuracy by
relying on algorithms more than they already do (Experiment 4; N = 671) relative to a normative standard.
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Experiment 5 examined how decision makers’ own expertise influenced reliance on algorithms. National security
professionals who make forecasts on a regular basis responded differently to algorithmic advice than laypeople did.
Experts (N = 70) relied less on algorithmic advice compared to laypeople (N = 301), heavily discounting any advice
they received. Although providing advice from algorithms may increase adherence to advice for non-experts, it seems
that algorithmic advice often falls on deaf expert ears.
What should researchers do? Researchers should explore experimental studies at the intersection of psychology
and artificial intelligence. Psychology research already plays an important role in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI)
for companies, however, important societal questions on how (and whether) AI shifts human cognitive capabilities,
human judgement, and more broadly human perception about societal issues is an open area of research. In this regard,
researchers are also exploring anthropomorphic approaches treating AI systems with human interactions.
3.3.7 Tracking Jobs, Skills and Inclusion in AI through LinkedIn
Mar Carpanelli, LinkedIn
This presentation focused on the challenges of measuring how AI and AI skills relate to the future of work. LinkedIn is
able to leverage data across roughly 650 million workers, 30 million companies, 23 million jobs, 90 thousand schools,
35 thousand skills, and hundreds of billions of pieces of content. This data can help to build a digital representation of
the global economy called the Economic Graph. By mapping every member, company, job, and school, LinkedIn is
able to transform the data into insights about the changing world of work that policymakers and researchers can use to
complement traditional statistics. Measuring AI Talent is important for the Future of Work because AI is changing the
way the global economy operates by (i) transforming jobs, (ii) requiring new skills, and (iii) creating new inclusion
challenges.
- Transforming jobs: One of LinkedIn metrics to look at how AI is transforming jobs is the AI hiring rate — which
is an index of how AI talent is being hired across countries over time. Preliminary results of joint research with the
Stanford AI Index team reveal that AI hiring is growing across all countries in the sample of over 30 countries, and
some of the fastest-growing countries are developed economies, such as Singapore, Australia, Canada, the US, but
developing countries are catching fast (incl. India and Brazil).
- Requiring new skills: LinkedIn leveraged member skills to identify the most representative AI skills across occu-
pations in the countries in the sample, their “Skills Genome.” For example, python libraries like Natural Language
Toolkit (NLTK) or Machine Learning (ML) are highly prevalent across most countries, but sentiment analysis and text
classification are especially prevalent in Singapore and India.
- Inclusion challenges: One of the many ways to look at inclusion challenges is gender. LinkedIn measured how
intensively AI skills are used by different genders across occupations and countries and found that across almost every
country the average occupation held by a female is less likely to signal AI skills as compared to the average occupation
held by a male. This said, Canada and some European countries (such as Switzerland and France) seem to be ahead
in terms of AI skill intensity among females.
What should researchers do? These kinds of metrics provide a foundation for a data-grounded discussion about
the labor market challenges associated with the emergence of AI and other disruptive technologies, and the policies
governments can put in place to both foster AI ecosystems and also tackle those challenges head-on. One example
of this in action: by identifying countries with fast growth in AI hiring, researchers can take a closer look into career
transitions into (and out of) the industry and identify how AI skills are diffusing across industries. These insights help
policymakers update educational programs and also help the private sector invest in relevant training. Similar data and
measurements can also shed light on the nature of gender gaps, helping policymakers design interventions aimed at
addressing the pipeline gap and the skills gap.
3.3.8 Global AI Talent
Yoan Mantha, ElementAI
There is strong evidence that the supply of top-tier AI talent does not meet the demand. Yet there is little visibility
on precisely how scarce this talent is or where it is concentrated around the world. This presentation summarized
ElementAI’s second survey of the scope and breadth of the worldwide AI talent pool. This research relied on three
main data sources. First, to get a picture of the researchers who are moving the field forward, the authors’ reviewed the
publications from 21 leading scientific conferences in the field of AI and analyzed the profiles of the authors. Second,
the authors analyzed the results of several targeted LinkedIn searches, which showed howmany individuals self-report
that they have doctorates as well as the requisite skills in different regions around the world. Finally, data was collected
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from outside reports and other secondary sources to help put the findings in context and better understand the talent
pool in a rapidly changing global AI landscape.
The results showed that:
- 22,400 people published at one or more of the top conferences in the field of machine learning in 2018, up 36% from
2015 and 19% from 2017.
- The number of peer-reviewed publications also rose, up 25% from 2015 and 16% from 2017.
- Women were underrepresented, making up just 18% of the researchers publishing in these conferences.
- The AI talent pool is highly mobile, with about one-third of researchers (out of the 22,400 published conference
authors) working for an employer based in a country other than the one where they received their PhD.
- About 18% of the authors who published their work at the 21 conferences included in this survey contributed to
research that had a major impact on the overall field as measured by citation counts in the last two years (2017-2018).
- The countries with the highest number of high-impact researchers (i.e., those within the 18%) were the United States,
China, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.
What should researchers do? Researchers should try to fuse multiple data sources together to help them build
new proxy indicators of major trends. They should also try to model the geographic aspects of different scientific
communities as this can provide information about country-level competitiveness. A more fundamental measurement
challenge for researchers is correcting bias from various data sources for accurate nationally representative samples
for the AI talent pool. For example, a complementary survey of LinkedIn profiles indicated a total of 36,524 people
who qualified as self-reported AI specialists, according to ElementAI’s search criteria. This represents a 66% increase
from the 2018 Global AI Talent report. Nevertheless, the findings in this survey indicate that there has been notable
growth and expansion, both in self-reported AI expertise and in the number of authors and scientific papers published
at AI conferences, reflecting a field that is dynamic and unmistakably international.
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